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8QLW\DQG'LYHUVLW\LQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V7HUULWRULDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ 
 
AILEEN MCHARG 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2006, I co-edited a book of essays considering aspects of public law in Scotland, both 
institutional and doctrinal, which diverged from those elsewhere in the United Kingdom (UK).1 
Such differences had persisted throughout the entire period since the Union of 1707, but had 
been extended and amplified by the asymmetric devolution arrangements introduced in 1999. 
In the introductory essay to that volume,2 I sought inter alia to classify and evaluate the nature 
and significance of the differences under discussion. I concluded that, although there were 
plenty of points of difference, it was harder to identify unequivocal examples of genuine 
distinctiveness²ie, fundamentally different answers to the basic questions of public law 
concerning the constitution, distribution, and regulation of governmental power, and the 
relationship between citizen and state.  
Had I cast my eye more widely, particularly to encompass Northern Ireland, with its 
long history of constitutional exceptionalism3 and a contemporary model of consociational 
governance underpinned by international agreement, I might have found more significant 
WHUULWRULDOGLYHUVLW\LQWKH8.¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWV Moreover, territorial diversity has 
increased since 2006, and particularly since the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. 
Further devolution has taken place in Scotland,4 Wales,5 and Northern Ireland,6 each following 
its own pattern and independent timetable.7 The changes in Scotland ushered in by the Scotland 
Act 2016, and to some extent replicated for Wales by the Wales Act 2017, are particularly 
significant, offering both guarantees of the constitutional status of the devolved institutions and 
giving them a new constitutional competence over their own composition and structure, as well 
as extending their policy-making and fiscal autonomy. Indeed, once the 2016 Act is fully 
implemented, Scotland will be amongst the most autonomous sub-state regions in the world.8 
In England, the introduction of English Votes for English Laws in October 2015 was 
symbolically important in marking the constitutional recognition of England as a distinct 
WHUULWRULDO HQWLW\ZKLOH WKH µFLW\GHYROXWLRQ¶SURJUDPPHDXWKRULVHGE\ WKH&LWLHVDQG/RFDO
Government Devolution Act 2016 introduces greater internal diversity to the governance of 
England.  
Further territorial divergence is also possible in the wake of the 2016 referendum on 
membership of the European Union (EU). Withdrawal from the EU (subject to whatever new 
arrangements may replace it) will remove an important cHQWULSHWDOIRUFHIURPWKH8.¶VFXUUHQW
constitutional architecture, which has constrained both devolved and UK institutions. It has 
                                                          
1 A McHarg and T Mullen (eds), Public Law in Scotland (Edinburgh, Avizandum Publishing Ltd, 2006). 
2 $0F+DUJµ3XEOLF/DZLQ6FRWODQG'LIIHUHQFHDQG'LVWLQFWLRQ¶ in McHarg and Mullen (eds), ibid, 3. 
3 See, eg, H Calvert, Constitutional Law in Northern Ireland: A Study in Regional Government (London and 
Belfast, Stevens & Sons, 1968); B Hadfield, The Constitution of Northern Ireland (Belfast, SLS Legal 
Publications, 1989). 
4 Scotland Act 2012; Scotland Act 2016. 
5 Government of Wales Act 2006; Wales Act 2014; Wales Act 2017.  
6 Corporation Tax (Northern Ireland) Act 2015; Northern Ireland (Stormont Agreement and Implementation Plan) 
Act 2016. 
7 On the divergent histories and trajectories of devolution in the UK, see in particular J Mitchell, Devolution in 
the UK (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011). 
8 6HH10F(ZHQµ$&RQVWLWXWLRQLQ)OX[The Dynamics of Constitutional Change after WKH5HIHUHQGXP¶ in A 
McHarg et al (eds), The Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2016) 225, 236±37. 
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DOVR FUHDWHG GHPDQG IRU IXUWKHU GHYROXWLRQ QRW RQO\ WKURXJK WKH µUHSDWULDWLRQ¶ RI SRZHUV
currently exercised at EU level, but which would otherwise fall within devolved competence, 
but also for substantial additional powers to enable the devolved governments to mitigate the 
effects of Brexit.9 Moreover, the differing territorial results in that referendum are themselves 
indicative of important territorial cleavages on fundamental constitutional questions, and have 
served to reopen debates in Scotland and Northern Ireland (which both produced majorities to 
remain in the EU) about the constitutional future of these territories. This may yet produce 
VRPHNLQGRIµGLIIHUHQWLDO%UH[LW¶for Scotland and Northern Ireland,10 although there are severe 
practical and political obstacles to such proposals. Similar territorial divergence can be found 
in attitudes to fundamental rights protection. Accordingly, if plans to reform the Human Rights 
Act ever come to fruition, it seems likely that this will also result in greater diversity of 
provision in different parts of the UK.  
,Q VKRUW WKH UHFHQW KLVWRU\ RI WKH 8.¶V WHUULWRULDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ is one of increasing 
divergence, and one which, given the failure of the 2014 referendum to settle the question of 
Scottish independence,11 and the revival of the border question in Northern Ireland since the 
EU referendum,12 appears to be following a disintegrative logic. Accordingly, as territorial 
diversity has increased, so too has concern about territorial unity. In other words, there is 
increasing interest in the question of what mechanisms exist to bind the UK state together in 
the face of territorial divergence.  
Early signs of such concerns can be detected in the initial debate over the adoption of a 
British Bill of Rights²an idea originally promoted by Gordon Brown as a positive means of 
UHLQIRUFLQJ%ULWLVKLGHQWLW\E\DUWLFXODWLQJDFRPPRQVHWRIµ%ULWLVKYDOXHV¶ as a counterweight 
to devolution,13 though it has subsequently acquired a more negative, anti-European character. 
Similar considerations can be found in the debate over the role of the Supreme Court as the 
guarantor of UK-wide constitutional standards,14 and in the attempt by the Calman 
Commission²the progenitor of the Scotland Act 2012²WR LGHQWLI\ µSULQFLSOHV RI 8QLRQ¶
which would provide a rational basis upon which to divide powers between the UK and 
devolved levels.15  
                                                          
9 See Scottish Government, 6FRWODQG¶V3ODFHLQ(XURSH(2016) ch 4; Welsh Government, 6HFXULQJ:DOHV¶)XWXUH
Transition from the European Union to a New Relationship with Europe (2017) ch 7. 
10 See %2¶/HDU\µThe Dalriada Document: Towards a Multi-National Compromise that Respects Diversity in 
the United Kingdom¶ (2016), available at 
www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/publications/reports/dalriada-document 1 6NRXWDULV µ)URP %ULWDLQ
and Ireland to Cyprus: Accommodating ³Divided Islands´ in the EU Political DQG/HJDO2UGHU¶ (2016), available 
at www.skoutaris.eu/working-papers; Scottish Government (n 9) ch 3; B Doherty et al, µNorthern Ireland and 
³%UH[LW´7KH(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF$UHD2SWLRQ¶DYDLODEOH at 
 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2933715. 
11
 Support for independence has remained high since the referendum: the 2016 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey 
recorded its highest ever level of support for independence (at 46%) and for the first time found that support for 
independence as the preferred constitutional solution was higher than for devolution ± J Curtice, Scottish Social 
Attitudes: From Indyref 1 to Indyref 2? The State of Nationalism in Scotland (Edinburgh, ScotCen Social 
Research, 2017).  The success of the Scottish National Party in the 2015 Westminster and 2016 Holyrood 
elections, coupled with the differential EU referendum outcome in Scotland, have ensured that the constitutional 
question remains high on the Scottish political agenda. 
12 See C Gormley-Heenan and $$XJKH\µGetting Our Country Back or Waking Up in a Different Country: 
%UH[LWDQG1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶British Journal of Politics and International Relations, forthcoming. Sinn Féin 
significantly increased its vote share at the March 2017 Northern Ireland Assembly elections, and has revived its 
campaign for a border poll on reunification with the Republic of Ireland. 
13 Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain (Cm 7170, 2007) ch 4. 
14 6HH$0F+DUJµ)LQDO$SSHDOVLQ6FRWV&ULPLQDO&DVHV¶, UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 4 October 
2011. 
15 Commission on Scottish Devolution, The Future of Scottish Devolution Within the Union: A First Report 
(2008). 
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Again, WKRXJKWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVKRFNSURYLGHGE\WKHUHODWLYHO\QDUURZµ1R¶YRWHLQ
the 2014 independence referendum has served to intensify such concerns, and the EU 
referendum result has given them additional impetus. A number of organisations and 
commentators have called for more or less comprehensive constitutional reform to move the 
8.¶VWHUULWRULDOFRQVWLWXWLRQLQDPRUHH[SOLFLWO\ IHGHUDOGLUHFWLRQ16 that is, one which pays 
greater attentiRQWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIµVKDUHGUXOH¶DORQJVLGHµVHOI-UXOH¶IRUWKH8.¶VWHUULWRULDO
units,17 a measure by which the UK currently performs poorly compared with other federal or 
devolved systems.18 Proposed reforms variously include institutional mechanisms to improve 
inter-governmental relations, enhance territorial representation in UK-wide decision-making, 
and reduce territorial asymmetry; the articulation of common values and purposes to guide the 
allocation and exercise of decision-making functions; and/or the establishment of a shared 
constitutional framework to empower and constrain both UK and devolved governance. To 
date, however, such proposals have had little or no practical impact. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the need for greater unity in the territorial 
constitution. However, rather than examining particular reform proposals in detail, its focus is 
primarily methodological. In other words, how do we decide what degree of territorial 
divergence is constitutionally acceptable? The chapter explores this question from four 
different perspectives²empirical, conceptual, normative, and political. Ultimately, I argue that 
the problem to be addressed²and hence the case for reform²is an essentially political one: a 
question of discovering how much diversity the state can bear without undermining the 
conditions necessary for the maintenance of sufficient political solidarity to sustain its common 
functions. It follows that the solutions are to be found primarily in mechanisms for political 
accommodation, which may go beyond the strictly constitutional, rather than in the articulation 
of legal values or the proliferation of legal constraints. Nevertheless, I also argue that there are 
formidable political barriers to the achievement of a successful balance between unity and 
GLYHUVLW\ LQ WKH 8.¶V WHUULWRULDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ The chapter concludes by using Brexit as an 
illustration both of the failure of political accommodation of territorial difference, and of the 
severe challenges which this presents. 
 
II. THE EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Any assessment of the need for greater territorial unity in the UK constitution has to start from 
a clear understanding of its current diversity. Patently, an empirical approach cannot tell us 
how much diversity ought to be permitted. Nevertheless, since the UK has a long tradition of 
diverse and asymmetric governance, it can tell us something useful about the nature and degree 
of diversity that has historically been tolerated, and what has changed²or is perceived to have 
changed²more recently such as to threaten the integrity of the state. Classifying difference 
                                                          
16 See, eg, House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Do We Need a Constitutional 
Convention for the United Kingdom? (4th Report 2012±13, HC 371); G Brown, My Scotland, Our Britain: A 
Future Worth Sharing (London, Simon & Schuster, 2014) ch 7; J Gallagher, The Day After Judgement: Scotland 
and the UK after the Referendum (Glasgow, Policy Scotland, 2014); House of Lords Constitution Committee, 
Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland (10th Report 2014±15, HL 145); House of Lords 
Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental Relations in the United Kingdom (11th Report 2014±15, HL 146); 
Wales Governance Centre, 7KH8.¶V&KDQJLQJ8QLRQ7RZDUGVD1HZ8QLRQ (Cardiff, 2015); Bingham Centre 
for the Rule of Law, A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United Kingdom (London, British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2015); R Hazell (ed), Devolution and the Future of the Union 
(London, Constitution Unit, 2015); Constitution Reform Group, Towards a New Act of Union: A Discussion Paper 
(2015); Constitution Reform Group, Act of Union Bill (2016); J Gallagher, Britain After Brexit: Toxic 
Referendums and Territorial Constitutions, (Glasgow, Policy Scotland, 2016). 
17 See McEwen (n 8) 227±33. 
18 ibid 237±40. 
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can also help us to understand the various ways in which constitutional diversity might be 
problematic, and might therefore require different countervailing strategies. However, an 
empirical perspective is also important in reminding us of the limits of territorial unity. To the 
extent that differences in territorial governance are the product of differing needs and demands 
in different parts of the state rather than mere accidents19²and perhaps even if they are²they 
carry their own historical legitimacy which is likely to limit the nature and degree of unity that 
can be achieved. For instance, an approach which advocated the abolition of the devolved 
legislatures, or even significant curtailment of their current powers, in the name of 
constitutional unity is likely to be a non-starter.20 
The territorial differences that are to be found within the UK could potentially be 
classified in a number of different ways.21 For present purposes, however, it is useful to 
distinguish between institutional diversity; diversity in constitutional values; and differences 
in how the state itself is understood. In each of these areas, although the existence of difference 
is by no means new, there have been important recent changes either in the nature and extent 
of territorial difference, or in the perception of its significance. 
 
A. Institutional Diversity 
 
The most obvious form of territorial diversity is institutional. Institutional variations in the 
governance of different parts of the UK are longstanding, and encompass both the extent to 
which different territories are able to govern themselves, and the models through which they 
do so.  
In the case of Scotland, institutional differences have existed since (and indeed were 
guaranteed by) the Union of 1707, and have been present to varying degrees in all three 
branches of state²legislative, executive and judicial²ever since.22 Whilst the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government in 199923 involved a significant extension of 
distinctively Scottish governmental arrangements, legislative devolution clearly built upon²
and drew some of its justification from²the high degree of institutional distinctiveness which 
already existed.  
Like Scotland, Northern Ireland also has its own legal system (albeit less distinct from 
that of England and Wales) and the longest history of legislative devolution. A Northern Ireland 
Parliament was established in 192124 following the partition of Ireland and the secession of the 
south, which exercised extensive powers over the province until the resumption of direct rule 
in 1972.25 When devolution was re-established in Northern Ireland in 1999,26 this involved 
further institutional divergence. Not only were the competences of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly different to those of the Scottish Parliament, but its structure was also materially 
different²based upon a principle of cross-community consent unique amongst UK 
representative bodies.  
                                                          
19 See Mitchell (n 7). 
20 Devolution is very popular in both Scotland and Wales: see eg A Henderson et al, µ1DWLRQDO,GHQWLW\RU1DWLRQDO
,QWHUHVW"6FRWWLVK(QJOLVKDQG:HOVK$WWLWXGHVWRWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'HEDWH¶Political Quarterly 265, 
Table 2. The situation in Northern Ireland is more complicated, but it is clear that the resumption of direct rule 
would be unacceptable to a significant proportion of Northern Irish opinion: VHHHJ$&RZEXUQµBritish Direct 
Rule wRXOG3ODFH1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGDW³0ercy of Hard Brexit Government´VD\V6'/3¶The Independent, 11 
January 2017. 
21 For a different approach to classification, see McHarg (n 2) 9±15.  
22 See McHarg, ibid 3±4; AC Page, Constitutional Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, W Green, 2015) ch 1. 
23 Scotland Act 1998. 
24 Government of Ireland Act 1920. 
25 See references in n 3. 
26 Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
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Wales historically enjoyed less institutional recognition, although a Secretary of State 
for Wales was established in 1964, and there were a number of Wales-specific public bodies.27 
The initial model of devolution established in 199928 was much weaker than its Scottish and 
Northern Irish counterparts, with no legislative or taxation powers, and until 2006 no formal 
distinction between the Welsh Government and Welsh Assembly.29 In 2011, however, the 
Welsh Assembly gained primary legislative powers,30 and the Wales Act 2014 gave it limited 
tax-raising powers. Both have been further enhanced by the Wales Act 2017, although some 
important differences between Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish devolution still remain, 
regarding not only the scope but also the form of devolved competences. 
The governance of England is distinct in having no separate representative structures; 
the UK Parliament and UK Government departments are by default also English institutions in 
areas devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland²something given a degree of formal 
recognition by the introduction of English Votes for English Laws.31 There is limited regional 
devolution within England. A Greater London Assembly with executive powers was 
established in 1999,32 but a planned programme of progressive devolution to other English 
regions33 was aborted following an unsuccessful referendum in the North East in 2004. 
Regional devolution has been revived in the form of the City Devolution programme,34 again 
on a rolling basis, but this is more accurately regarded as a form of enhanced local government, 
which builds upon existing institutions rather than adding a new layer of territorial governance. 
The devolution programme of the late 1990s was undoubtedly a constitutional 
development of major importance. While the earlier experience of devolution in Northern 
Ireland could be regarded as an exceptional response to the peculiar exigencies of that territory, 
the creation of new representative structures for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland²and 
the subsequent strengthening, deepening, and widening of the principle of devolution²
represents a much clearer commitment to constitutional pluralism. This is apparent not merely 
from the fact that devolution creates new centres of political power, but also from the 
willingness to tailor the devolved institutions to the particular circumstances of each nation or 
region.  
Both of these features are significant in understanding the impact of increased 
institutional diversity. New representative institutions (or in England, the lack of them) appear 
to have strengthened or at least consolidated sub-state political identities, as expressed in felt 
national identity, stated constitutional preferences, and electoral behaviour.35 They have also 
provided a forum, through the exercise of devolved legislative and executive competences, and 
the process of electoral competition, for the accentuation and proliferation of political, 
institutional and policy differences. These effects were muted in the early years of devolution 
by political convergence at UK, Scottish and Welsh levels, and by the preoccupation in 
Northern Ireland with consolidating the peace process (with the consequent suspension of 
                                                          
27 See R Rawlings, Delineating Wales: Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Aspects of National Devolution 
(Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 2003) ch 1; Mitchell (n 7) ch 3. 
28 Government of Wales Act 1998. 
29 Government of Wales Act 2006. 
30 Following a referendum held under Government of Wales Act 2006, s 103. 
31 Introduced via a change to the House of Commons Standing Orders: see HC Deb, vol 600, col 1159, 22 October 
2015. 
32 Greater London Authority Act 1999. 
33 Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act 2003; Office of Deputy Prime Minister, Draft Regional Assemblies 
Bill (Cm 6285, 2004). 
34 Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. 
35 See, eg, J Curtice et alµ'HYROXWLRQ¶in A Park et al (eds), British Social Attitudes: The 30th Report (London, 
NatCen Social Research, 2013) 139; Henderson et al (n 20). 
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devolution on several occasions),36 but have become more pronounced as electoral outcomes 
have diverged.  
As devolution has become better established and territorial divergence has increased, 
so too the territorial dimension of the UK state has become more pronounced. In particular, 
demands for territorial differences to be respected have spilled over the boundaries of devolved 
competencies to include formally reserved matters such as EU withdrawal37 and human rights 
reform,38 as well as more mundane policy issues.39 In turn, this has made the anomalies arising 
from asymmetric devolution much more visible40²demanding a response which further 
institutionalises territorial difference and which has an inherent decentralising logic. We see 
this, for example, in the repeated revisions of the Welsh devolution arrangements, in order to 
µFDWFKXS¶ZLWKWKHVWURQJHUarrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland. It was also made 
explicit by David Cameron following the Scottish independence referendum, when he insisted 
that stronger powers for Scotland had to be balanced by territorial recognition for England in 
the form of English Votes for English Laws.41 
 
B. Diversity of Values 
 
In my 2006 essay, I concluded that institutional differences, and the detailed and contextual 
differences flowing from them, were the most significant marker of constitutional 
distinctiveness in Scotland.42 There were some arguable differences in relation to constitutional 
values, such as the commitment accompanying devolution to a more participatory and 
consensual style of democracy compared with Westminster, and stronger protection for 
fundamental rights. However, it was questionable how much difference the former actually 
made in practice, while the latter seemed to be attributable more to the subordinate status of 
the Scottish Parliament than to a genuine difference in commitment to rights. 
Since 2006, value differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK seem to have 
increased. The reduction in the voting age from 18 to 16, first for the 2014 independence 
referendum43 and subsequently for Scottish Parliament and local government elections,44 
reinforces the commitment to a more inclusive democracy and creates an important difference 
in citizenship rights between Scotland and the rest of the UK. Greater differences have also 
opened up in relation to fundamental rights protection. The current Scottish Government is 
opposed to any weakening of current human rights protection, and indeed is committed to the 
extension of protections to include social and economic rights.45 More generally, constitutional 
                                                          
36 In 2000, 2001 and between 2002 and 2007. 
37 See, eg, the interventions by the Scottish and Welsh Governments in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union [2017] 2 WLR 583, arguing that their consent to legislation authorising withdrawal from the 
EU was required under the Sewel Convention because of its impact on devolved competence, as well as their 
more general arguments for special treatment in the implementation of Brexit: see references in n 9. 
38 Again, the Scottish Government has asserted a right to veto human rights reform via the Sewel Convention: see 
,-DPLHVRQµ7KH5HSHDORIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FWDQGWKH6HZHO&RQYHQWLRQLQ6FRWODQG¶Scottish Constitutional 
Futures Forum Blog, 12 June 2015; 0(OOLRWWµ7KH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWWKH6HZHO&RQYHQWLRQDQGWKH5HSHDO
of the Human Rights Act: A 3RVWVFULSW¶Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum Blog, 28 September 2015. 
39 6HHHJ70XOOHQDQG6&UDLJµ7KH,PPLJUDWLRQ%LOO5HVHUYHG0DWWHUVDQGWKH6HZHO&RQYHQWLRQ¶Scottish 
Constitutional Futures Forum Blog, 15 April 2016.  
40 See, eg, Henderson et al (n 20) 271. 
41 D Cameron, µIn Full: Statement on the UK¶V)XWXUH¶, 19 September 2014, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-29271765.  
42 McHarg (n 2) 9±15, 22. 
43 Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013. 
44 Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Act 2015. 
45 See, eg, Scottish Government, A Plan for Scotland: The GovernmenW¶V 3URJUDPPH IRU 6FRWODQG ±17 
(Edinburgh, Scottish Government, 2016) 82. 
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debate in Scotland has not exhibited the same hostility to human rights protection or anti-
Europeanism found elsewhere in the UK²something borne out by the clear majority (62 per 
cent) in Scotland in the EU referendum to remain in the EU.  
In Northern Ireland, as already noted, value differences are even more readily apparent. 
Democratic practices have long been different. During the 27-year period of direct rule from 
Westminster, democracy in Northern Ireland was deeply impoverished; thanks to their numbers 
DQG1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶VVHSDUDWHSDUW\V\VWHP1RUWKHUQ,ULVK03VKDGOLPLWHGRSSRUWXQLW\WR
influence UK level decision-making, while local government in Northern Ireland was (and still 
is) weak compared with other parts of the UK. Following the resumption of devolution in 1999, 
the adoption of a principle of power-sharing between political parties in the Northern Ireland 
Executive and Northern Ireland Assembly was a deliberate rejection of the majoritarian style 
of democracy which had in the past produced (or at least was perceived to have produced) 
systematic discrimination against the Catholic minority.46 We also find significant historical 
and contemporary differences in human rights practice, both in terms of the nature of the rights 
which are recognised and the extent to which they are respected. Historically, both under 
devolution and direct rule, there have been extensive departures from human rights norms 
applied elsewhere in the UK.47 Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement,48 by contrast, rights-
consciousness has been much greater.49 The Agreement includes strong guarantees of respect 
for the European Convention on Human Rights, along with a commitment to an indigenous 
human rights process,50 although due to greater social conservativism in Northern Ireland, 
rights in areas such as abortion and homosexual equality still lag behind the UK norm.  
However, the extent to which these constitutional differences have been recognised as 
such has been muted by two factors. One is²again²the perception of Northern Irish 
exceptionalism²ie, differences tend to be seen as temporary aberrations explained by the 
3URYLQFH¶VWURXEOHGSRlitical history. The second is the weakly-constitutionalised nature of the 
UK in general, which means that value differences, for instance over matters such as abortion 
or equality rights, have tended to be regarded as political rather than constitutional. As in 
Scotland, though, the constitutional significance of value differences has become more difficult 
to ignore, with issues such as human rights reform and EU withdrawal again exposing 
important territorial differences between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. Both sets of 
reforms are difficult to reconcile with the terms and spirit of the Good Friday Agreement, and 
risk upsetting the fragile constitutional equilibrium that has been built since 1998.51 
Significant value differences are harder to detect in Wales, perhaps reflecting its longer 
history of close integration with England, and weaker form of devolution, as well as less 
distinct electoral patterns. The EU referendum result in Wales was very similar to that in 
England,52 although here it is English attitudes which are distinct in that Euroscepticism has a 
correlation with (English) nationalism in England that is not found in other parts of the UK.53 
                                                          
46 See eg Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, Disturbances in Northern Ireland 
(Cameron Report) (Cmd 532, Belfast, HMSO, 1969); Northern Ireland Office, The Future of Northern Ireland: 
A Paper for Discussion (London, HMSO, 1972). 
47 See, eg, B Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
48 Northern Ireland Office, The Belfast Agreement (1998). 
49 On the significance of human rights to the achievement of peace in Northern Ireland, see C Bell, Peace 
Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). 
50 See Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland (Belfast, NIHRC, 2008). 
51 See House of Lords EU Select Committee, Brexit: UK±Irish Relations (6th Report 2016±17, HL 76) ch 4. 
52 Wales voted by 52.5% to leave the EU, and England by 53.4%. 
53 See R Wyn Jones et al, England and its Two Unions: The Anatomy of a Nation and its Discontents (London, 
IPPR, 2013). 
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However, the (Labour-controlled) Welsh Government is also opposed to reform of the Human 
Rights Act,54 and the devolution of local government and Welsh Assembly elections by the 
Wales Act 2017 opens space for further divergence here too. 
 
C. Differing Theories of the State 
 
The final area of territorial constitutional difference concerns how the UK state itself is 
understood. Formally, it is a unitary state, with a single source of sovereignty located in the 
UK Parliament. This unitary conception has come under pressure in recent years, particularly 
DVDUHVXOWRIWKH8.¶VPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8 EU membership both added another territorial 
layer of decision-making, and challenged the sovereignty of the UK Parliament. However, the 
recent vote in favour of Brexit in England and Wales, premised on the need to restore 
parliamentary sovereignty, along with broader hostility to other features of a more 
cosmopolitan constitutional order,55 such as the role of the European Court of Human Rights 
as an external check on sovereignty, indicates the continued relevance and popular appeal of 
the unitary state account as a theory of the territorial constitution.56 
Nevertheless, the unitary state account has long been internally contested. In Scotland, 
DQ DOWHUQDWLYH µXQLRQ VWDWH¶ account, which regards the continued existence of the state as 
resting upon the consent of its constituent parts, and sovereignty as belonging to the plural 
peoples of the UK, rather than to the Westminster Parliament, has considerable contemporary 
resonance, even if its historical credentials as a distinctive Scottish constitutional tradition are 
a matter of dispute.57 This account has received some symbolic58 and practical recognition²
most significantly in the willingness of the UK Government to facilitate the holding of a lawful 
referendum on independence in 2014.59 Nevertheless, it cannot be seen unequivocally to have 
displaced the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as the fundamental rule of the constitution. 
For instance, the acknowledgment in the Scotland Act 2016 of the permanence of the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government (subject to a referendum vote in Scotland) and the 
statutory confirmation of the Sewel Convention60 were accompanied by continued assertions 
that parliamentary sovereignty was unaffected and ambiguous wording both of which 
undermine their status as legally-binding or justiciable guarantees. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
held in the recent Miller case61 that the 2016 Act had made no difference to the legal status of 
the Sewel convention, and had not rendered it in any way justiciable. 
The union state account of the territorial constitution also has resonance in Northern 
Ireland, where the principle that the Province¶V continued membership of the UK rests on the 
consent of its people has been recognised by statute since 1973.62 In addition, the grounding of 
1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\JRYHUQDQFHDUUDQJHPHQWVLQ the Good Friday Agreement²
an international treaty between the UK and the Republic of Ireland²and the sharing of 
                                                          
54 6HH''HDQVµ:HOVK*RYHUQPHQWZLOOGR³(YHU\WKLQJLW&DQ´WR%ORFN5HSHDORIWKH+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW¶
Wales Online, 18 May 2015. 
55 See A Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014). 
56 cI0/RXJKOLQµ7KH(QGRI$YRLGDQFH¶London Review of Books, 28 July 2016. 
57 6HH&.LGGµ6RYHUHLJQW\DQGWKH6FRWWLVK&RQVWLWXWLRQ%HIRUH¶Juridical Review 225; S Tierney, 
µ6FRWODQG DQG WKH 8QLRQ 6WDWH¶ LQ 0F+DUJ DQd Mullen (n 1), 25; I McLean, :KDW¶V :URQJ ZLWK WKH %ULWLVK
Constitution (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) ch 3.  
58 See, eg, MacCormick v Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396; Claim of Right 1988; Scotland Act 2016, s 1. 
59 See HM Government/Scottish Government, Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the 
Scottish Government on a Referendum on Independence for Scotland WKHµ(GLQEXUJK$JUHHPHQW¶ 
60 ie, the rule that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate with respect to devolved matters except with the 
consent of the relevant devolved legislature. 
61 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 2 WLR 583. 
62 Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, s 1; see now Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 1. 
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sovereignty across the Irish border on a range of issues is difficult to reconcile with a unitary 
account of the UK state.63 Again, though, parliamentary sovereignty has not formally been 
displaced. For instance, the Supreme Court in the Northern Irish proceedings heard in parallel 
with Miller firmly rejected the attempt to elevate the principle of consent into a general 
requirement to seek the consent of the people of Northern Ireland for any significant 
constitutional change.64 
Even in Wales, where there is no historic legacy of independent statehood, and where 
devolution did not proceed upon an assertion of a right to national self-determination, the 
:HOVK *RYHUQPHQW KDV UHFHQWO\ DVVHUWHG WKDW µ>Z@KDWHYHU LWV KLVWRULFDO RULJLQV WKH 8QLWHG
.LQJGRPLVEHVWVHHQQRZDVDYROXQWDU\DVVRFLDWLRQRIQDWLRQV¶DQGWKDWµ>W@KHDOORFDWLRQRI
legislative and executive functions between central UK institutions and devolved institutions 
should be based on the concept of subsidiarity, acknowledging popular sovereignty in each part 
of the UK¶.65 Thus, the Wales Act 2017 has extended the same constitutional guarantees to 
Wales as are contained in sections 1 and 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, albeit subject to the same 
caveats. 
As these various qualifications suggest, these alternative understandings of the nature 
of the territorial constitution have been essentially peripheral. This is true both in a geographic 
sense²WKHOLYHGUHDOLW\IRUWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKH8.¶VSRSXODWLRQresident in England is that 
of a unitary system of government²and in the VHQVHRIEHLQJXQRIILFLDOµSROLWLFDO¶UHDGLQJVRI
the constitution rather than ones given unambiguous legal expression.  
Again, though, in recent years, territorial divergences in how the constitution is 
theorised have become harder to ignore. On the one hand, the 2014 independence referendum 
KDV WUDQVIRUPHG 6FRWODQG¶V FODLP WR SRSXODU VRYHUHLJQW\ IURP D WKHRUHWLFDO DVVHUWLRQ WR D
practical reality which threatens to destroy the UK state. Although the right of the Scottish 
Parliament to call a second independence referendum is not legally secure,66 the 2014 
referendum creates a political precedent which may be difficult to ignore.67 On the other hand, 
EU withdrawal and the threat of human rights reform have exposed the fundamental 
incompatibility EHWZHHQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG¶V WUDQVQDWLRQDO FRQVWLWXWLRQDO RUGHU DQG WKH
traditional unitary constitution, and the obstacle²albeit again primarily a political one²that 
its constrained constitution poses to the free exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
III. THE CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
                                                          
63 See C Campbell et alµ7KH)URQWLHUVRI/HJDO$QDO\VLV5HIUDPLQJWKH7UDQVLWLRQLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶
66 MLR 317. 
64 Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland²In the matter of an application by Agnew and others 
for Judicial Review; Reference by the Court of Appeal (Northern Ireland)²In the matter of an application by 
Raymond McCord for Judicial Review [2017] 2 WLR 583, [134]±[35]. 
65 :HOVK*RYHUQPHQWµ:ULWWHQ(YLGHQFH¶+RXVHRI/RUGV6HOHFW&RPPLWWHHRQWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQThe Union and 
Devolution²Evidence (2016) para 6. 
66 For discussion, see G Anderson et alµ7KH,QGHSHQGHQFH5HIHUHQGXP/HJDOLW\DQGWKH&RQWHVWHG&RQVWLWXWLRQ
:LGHQLQJWKH'HEDWH¶UK Constitutional Law Association Blog, 31 January 2012. 
67
 On 28 March 2017, the Scottish Parliament voted in support of a motion requesting the enactment of another 
Order under section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 to facilitate the holding of a second independence referendum 
in Autumn 2019 (Motion S5M-04710 (Nicola Sturgeon) SPOR, 28 March 2017 (Session 5)).  Although, at the 
time of writing, the Prime Minister has indicated that she will reject this request, on the basis that the timing is 
inappropriate, she has not ruled out the possibility of a second referendum altogether.  It remains to be seen 
whether the Scottish Government will choose to proceed with a referendum Bill without the legal comfort of a 
section 30 Order, or whether some compromise will be reached over its timing. The degree of popular support 
for a second referendum is likely to be a determining factor in whether or not the Prime Minister is willing to 
acceGHWRWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQW¶VUHTXHVW 
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Having established the nature and extent of territorial diversity within the UK, the question can 
now be addressed whether this position is sustainable. One way of approaching this issue is 
through a conceptual lens; that is, asking how much constitutional diversity can be 
accommodated within a single state order.  
Constitutions have classically been associated with states,68 and this would appear to 
place limits on the degree to which constitutional arrangements may diverge within a particular 
state. This µmonist¶69 account of the relationship between state and constitution does not 
necessarily require a unitary constitution with a single sovereign; on the contrary, federal 
constitutional systems70 are intended to accommodate (in varying degrees) a significant 
measure of internal pluralism. However, the parameters within which sub-state units may 
diverge in federal systems are typically set by and contained within a single, overarching 
constitutional framework, which provides mechanisms for resolving conflicts of authority. 
Federal constitutions, in other words, provide for the division and sharing of constitutional 
authority within the territory of a particular state, rather than the creation of distinct and parallel 
constitutional orders.  
Monist accounts of the relationship between state and constitution are challenged by 
pluralist constitutional theories, which argue that constitutional orders can exist without being 
associated with states, and that multiple constitutional orders can co-exist within the same 
territorial space without any relationship of hierarchy between them.71 Although developed to 
account for the competing supremacy claims of the EU and its member states, the decoupling 
of constitution from state also suggests that radical constitutional pluralism may exist within as 
well as beyond the state.72 
Loughlin objects to pluralist constitutional theories on the basis that they fail adequately 
to account for the link between constitutions and the exercise of governmental authority.73 In 
a situation of constitutional pluralism, he argues, there is no means of authoritatively resolving 
conflicts between constitutional orders. Interactions between them can be explained only as a 
matter of pure power politics, or else it is necessary to invoke some set of higher order 
principles which can be used to determine when one system ought to defer to another²ie, to 
revert to a form of constitutional monism. He further objects to the decoupling of constitution 
from state on the ground that this requires constitutional orders to demonstrate their own, 
independent authority. For a sub-state unit to assert that it forms a distinct constitutional order 
within the state would therefore constitute a challenge to the authority of the state itself. It 
follows that, within any system of territorial governance, there must be a degree of 
constitutional unity to authoritatively explain and regulate the relationship of the parts to the 
whole. In fact, sub-state national units do typically seek accommodation within or recognition 
by the host state constitution for their distinct constitutional aspirations, and the absence of 
such recognition does indeed pose a threat to the survival of the state.74 
                                                          
68 See &0*+LPVZRUWKµ,QD6WDWH1R/RQJHU7KH(QGRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP?¶>@PL 639. 
69 1:DONHUµ7KH,GHDRI&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3OXUDOLVP¶MLR 317, 337. 
70 These include federations proper, as well as confederations, federacies, models of associated statehood, 
constitutionally decentralized unions, condominiums, leagues, joint functional authorities and less formal 
asymmetrical federal arrangements: see, eg, DJ Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, University 
of Alabama Press, 1987); RL Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 3rd edn (Montreal, McGill-4XHHQ¶V3UHVV
2008). 
71 See, eg, N MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999); Walker (n 69); M 
Avbelj and J Komárek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2012). 
72 6HH67LHUQH\ µ5HIUDPLQJ6RYHUHLJQW\"6XE-State National Societies and Contemporary Challenges to the 
1DWLRQ 6WDWH¶   ICLQ 161; S Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
73 0/RXJKOLQµ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO3OXUDOLVP$Q2[\PRURQ"¶Global Constitutionalism 9. 
74 See Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (n 72) 100±01; 125±26. 
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Nevertheless, the need, in the final analysis, to have some means of making sense of 
the internal diversity of a constitutional order patently does not take us very far in determining 
how much constitutional diversity may be tolerated. Real world constitutions exhibit widely 
varying degrees of internal pluralism, differing not only in terms of where the lines are drawn 
between central and sub-state level decision-making and in the amount of variation permitted 
to sub-state regions in their own constitutional arrangements, but also in the extent of 
asymmetry they permit.75 On the face of it, institutional diversity might appear to be less 
threatening to constitutional unity than value pluralism, which in turn might seem less 
problematic than divergent theories of the state. But two further conceptual points can be made 
here. The first is that diversity is not the same as disunity.76 In practice, it may be possible to 
maintain a significant diversity of constitutional values without threatening constitutional unity 
provided that upholding one set of values in one part of the state does not pose any risk, whether 
actual or symbolic, to the maintenance of a different set of values in another part. What matters, 
in other words, is not the achievement of homogeneity, but rather the avoidance of conflict. 
Secondly, it is possible for interpretive conflicts to exist, even on matters as fundamental as 
the theory of the state, without them necessarily having to be authoritatively resolved. All 
constitutional orders contain gaps and silences, which may have strategic value in the 
management of what might otherwise be damaging disagreements and tensions.77 Key aspects 
of the constitution may thus FRQVWLWXWHµLQFRPSOHWHO\WKHRULVHGDJUHHPHQWV¶78 that is, they may 
attract mutual commitment from different groups without agreeing on exactly what it is to 
which they are committed. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from this. One is that, irrespective of whether one 
adopts a monist or pluralist conception of the relationship between constitutions and states, 
further criteria are needed to determine the degree of divergence that will or should prevail in 
any particular context. The other is that institutional arrangements may be just as, if not more, 
important than constitutional values or theories of the state to the achievement of a successful 
balance between constitutional unity and diversity, as a key determinant of how effectively 
territorial conflicts can be avoided or managed.  
 
IV. THE NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
A conceptual approach tells us that there needs to be some means of creating order out of 
diversity in any pluralistic constitutional system. However, a normative perspective may be 
more helpful in identifying the precise nature and degree of unity that is required. Normative 
arguments may be directed at identifying common minimum standards that must be respected 
throughout the state, and/or issues that must be decided in common, and/or common purposes 
to guide the allocation and regulation of decision-making competences. Such proposals are a 
SURPLQHQWIHDWXUHRIWKHUHFHQWOLWHUDWXUHRQUHIRUPRIWKH8.¶VWHUULWRULDOFRQVWLWXWLRQ79 The 
difficulty, however, is to identify appropriate normative standards. 
One approach is to invoke abstract principles of constitutionalism, such as a shared 
commitment to democracy, the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights.80 While the 
blandness of such values makes them relatively uncontroversial, their very abstraction and 
                                                          
75 See references in n 67; G Anderson and S Choudhry, Constitutional Transitions and Territorial Cleavages 
(Stockholm, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2015). 
76 Elazar (n 70) 64. 
77 See M Foley, The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps, µAbeyances¶ and Political Temperament in the Maintenance 
of Government (London and New York, Routledge, 1989). 
78 CR Sunstein, µ,QFRPSOHWHO\7KHRUL]HG$JUHHPHQWV¶Harvard Law Review 1733. 
79 See references in n 16. 
80 See eg, Bingham Centre (n 16) xiii; Brown (n 16) 195; Constitution Reform Group (2016) (n 16). 
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universality makes them unhelpful as a unifying force for the UK constitution. Broad 
statements of principle necessarily permit of a range of different interpretations in practice. If, 
on the one hand, their purpose is simply to establish a minimum floor below which no part of 
the state may fall, it is not clear what they would add to existing constitutional protections 
(particularly at the devolved level) nor that there is any real problem to be addressed. The 
accusation that there are systematic violations of minimum standards of constitutional propriety 
in any part of the UK is one that (at least under current constitutional arrangements) would be 
hard to sustain.  
If, on the other hand, such principles are to be applied uniformly, then the questions 
arise as to who is to decide how they are to be interpreted and why their interpretation is to be 
preferred. Why, for instance, should the decision of the UK Parliament as to the level of human 
rights protection prevail over that of the devolved legislatures, especially if the latter are 
committed to a higher standard, or a broader range of rights? Similarly, why is the view of the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court on the Convention compatibility of matters within devolved 
competence to be preferred where the local courts have taken a different view? These are, of 
course, not merely hypothetical examples, but issues of concrete political controversy,81 which 
raise sensitive issues about the asymmetry of the U.¶VSRSXODWLRQVDQGKHQFH the vulnerability 
of the minority nations to being overridden by the English majority or carelessly assimilated to 
an English norm.  
7KH LQYRFDWLRQRI D VHW RIPRUH DXWKHQWLFDOO\ µ%ULWLVK¶YDOXHVRUSXUSRVHVZRXOG LQ
principle be a PRUH VDWLVIDFWRU\ IRUP RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO µJOXH¶ WR KROG WKH 8. WRJHWKHU In 
practice, however, this proves to be even more problematic. Again, any attempt to identify 
common standards risks simply exposing rather than the resolving differences. Most obviously, 
it may expose territorial difference. For instance, the idea of a distinctively British Bill of 
Rights quickly ran up against the reality of different legal traditions, as well as different 
attitudes to rights protection in different parts of the UK.82 But it also runs the risk of exposing 
political differences more generally. For example, post-independence referendum debates 
about the appropriateness of devolving welfare and abortion powers to the Scottish Parliament 
revealed cross-party disagreement about the role of common social rights as a necessary 
condition of political solidarity across the UK.83  
A second problHP LV WKDW WKH LGHD RI µSULQFLSOHV¶ RU µSXUSRVHV¶ RI WKH 8QLRQ LV
profoundly ahistorical. The UK¶V constitution has never been a teleological one; on the 
contrary, its defining feature²the principle of parliamentary sovereignty²is one which 
explicitly eschews the idea of a fixed ideological purpose. In practice, therefore, attempts to 
define the purposes of Union tend either towards the tautologous²eg, the Constitution Reform 
*URXS¶VGUDIW$FWRI8QLRQ%LOO unhelpfully VWDWHVWKDWµ[t]he purpose of the United Kingdom 
is to provide a strong and effective union between the peoples of the constituent nations and 
SDUWV¶84²or else require the imputation of a rationale which is both historically and politically 
contentious. Gallagher argues, for example, that the Union encompasses principles of political, 
economic and social integration; hence the development of the territorial constitution must be 
FRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKH8.¶VVLQJOHH[WHUQDOIDFHLWVIXOO\-integrated economy, 
and a substantial degree of social solidarity.85 In reality, though, the rationale for the Union has 
                                                          
81 As to the former, the question whether the consent of the devolved legislatures is required for reform or repeal 
of the Human Rights Act. As to the latter, cf the controversy over the Cadder and Fraser cases: see McHarg (n 
14). 6HHDOVR')HOGPDQµ1RQH 2QHRU6HYHUDO"3HUVSHFWLYHVRQWKH8.¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQV¶CLJ 329. 
82 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice before Us (2012) ch 9. 
83 See eg HM Government, 7KH3DUWLHV¶3XEOLVKHG3URSRVDOVRQ)XUWKHU'HYROXWLRQ IRU Scotland (Cm 8946, 
7*RUGRQµ5HYHDOHGThe Devolution Powers Shelved at the Last Minute from the Smith Commission 
5HSRUW¶, The Herald, 30 November 2014. 
84 Constitutional Reform Group (2016) (n 16) cl 1.1(1). 
85 Gallagher (2014) (n 16) 10±13, 15. 
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changed over time; contemporary ideas of a single market or social union would not have made 
sense at the time the Union was forged. Instead, the initial purpose of the Anglo±Scottish Union 
was narrowly focused (for the Scots) on ensuring access to markets and (for the English) on 
securing the Protestant succession to the Crown. These concerns were later superseded by a 
common commitment to empire, and later still to a high standard of social protection through 
a common welfare state86²a commitment which itself may now be on the wane.87 In fact, 
contemporary interpretations of the requirements of economic, social and political union 
appear to owe as much to the principles of the European Union, as they do to any historically 
authentic British understanding. Moreover, they have a tendency to shift as political 
circumstances change. Thus, for example, the reforms to the Scottish devolution settlement 
proposed by the Calman Commission,88 and implemented by the Scotland Act 2012, were 
superseded by the post-independence referendum Smith Commission proposals89 before they 
had even come fully into effect. Now Brexit has reopened debate about what powers are 
suitable for devolution90 before the post-Smith reforms, implemented by the Scotland Act 
2016, have themselves come fully into force.  
If, as this suggests, the British Union has always been a protean and evolving concept,91 
then any attempt to fix its meaning is arguably misguided, undermining the very flexibility that 
has ensured its longevity. Paradoxically, therefore, the attempt to identify British values or 
SXUSRVHVPD\LWVHOIEHUHJDUGHGDVEHLQJLQDQLPSRUWDQWVHQVHµXQ%ULWLVK¶ This in fact points 
to a final problem with normative projects of this nature, namely the naivety of the assumption 
that an explicit legal statement of common principles will itself have a cohesive effect. The 
problem of increasing constitutional divergence is not simply that people have not thought 
carefully enough about what it means to be British, or about the purpose and benefits of the 
UK state. On the contrary, having to mount an explicit defence of the Union is itself an 
indication that it is in trouble. As Kidd has argued, the Union was at its strongest when it was 
simply taken for granted.92 Thus the demand to (as Gallagher puts it) µcrystallise¶ the Union 
seems to ignore the basic truth which underpins the traditional British preference for political 
rather than legal constitutionalism: if the political conditions for solidarity across the 
constituent nations of the Union are absent, an abstract statement of constitutional principles 
cannot fill the void. On the contrary, it may make things worse, if particular territories feel that 
their political and constitutional aspirations are being curtailed in the QDPHRIFRPPRQµ%ULWLVK¶
values to which they do not subscribe. &OHDUO\JLYHQWKHDV\PPHWU\RIWKH8.¶VSRSXODWLRQV
the minority nations are most vulnerable to being overridden by UK-wide standards, but the 
reverse situation, in which the English majority is constrained by the values of the minority 
nations, is equally problematic. 
 
V. THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
$V WKLV ODVW SRLQW VXJJHVWV WKH SUREOHP RI LQFUHDVLQJ GLYHUVLW\ LQ WKH 8.¶V WHUULWRULDO
constitution is, at root, a political, rather than a normative or conceptual, one. The problem is 
                                                          
86 See, eg, L Colley, Acts of Union and Disunion (London, Profile Books Ltd, 2014). 
87 70XOOHQµ7KH6FRWWLVK,QGHSHQGHQFH5HIHUHQGXP¶Journal of Law and Society 627, 637. 
88 Commission on Scottish Devolution, Serving Scotland Better: Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 21st 
Century: Final Report (2009). 
89 The Smith Commission, Report of the Smith Commission for Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (2014). 
90 See references in n 9 and Gallagher (2016) (n 16). 
91 M KHDWLQJµ&DQWKH8QLRQ%H6DYHGfrom Unionists?¶, Centre on Constitutional Change Blog, 18 September 
2015. 
92 C Kidd, Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500±2000 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) ch 1. 
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political in at least two senses. First, constitutional divergence is a symptom rather than the 
cause of political fragmentation across the UK. Certainly, as noted above, devolution has 
accentuated the pluralisation of political identities and behaviour, and contributed to a 
weakening sense of common citizenship. But devolution itself must be understood at least in 
part as a response to political fragmentation, and the decline of a compelling sense of common 
purpose. The reasons for that are complex,93 and are themselves territorially divergent,94 but it 
would be a mistake to assume that it is solely the result of political change in the devolved 
nations and regions themselves. Behaviour by successive UK governments, particularly the 
hollowing out of the state through the pursuit of a neo-liberal political agenda,95 and austerity-
driven attacks on the welfare state,96 have also been significant in undermining markers of 
common UK citizenship, just as it is the UK government which has undermined common 
constitutional commitments by MHRSDUGLVLQJWKH8.¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSDQGSURSRVLQJWRGLOXWH
human rights protections. In the absence of a common purpose, defence of the Union has taken 
on a transactional quality; something demonstrated vividly during the Scottish independence 
referendum campaign when the Unionist side struggled to articulate a positive vision of the 
UK, instead selling it to Scottish voters essentially as an insurance policy against economic and 
defence-related risk.97 It is, however, hard to feel a strong sense of solidarity with an insurance 
provider, especially if some of its functions are potentially capable of replication by other 
means.  
The problem is also political in the sense that territorial conflict has been exacerbated 
E\WKHODFNRIDµIHGHUDOVSLULW¶ RUµIHGHUDOPLQGVHW¶ at the centre of the constitution.98 Again, 
this is not necessarily new,99 but it is accentuated by the double asymmetry of devolution²ie, 
the lack of separate representative institutions for England, along with the failure to reform the 
central constitutional apparatus to take account of devolution.100 The crude assumption often 
VHHPVWREHWKDWGHYROXWLRQKDVµVROYHG¶WKHSUREOHPRIWHUULWRULDOGLIIHUHQFHRULILWKDVQRW
solved the problem, then the answer is more devolution), and hence that matters reserved to 
the centre can unproblematically be decided according to a simple UK-wide majority. Such an 
approach often seems insensitive to the intertwined nature of devolved and reserved 
competences, and hence to the possibility of creating problematic spill-over effects for the 
devolved institutions. Nor is it sensitive to the contested nature of the territorial constitution, 
as regards both the appropriate boundaries between UK and devolved competences and the 
location of sovereign power. 
If the problem of constitutional diversity is essentially political, the implication is that 
it also requires a political solution²that is, one which promotes political inclusion and the 
avoidance of territorial conflict, rather than which attempts to impose or re-impose uniformity. 
This in turn suggests a focus on institutional rather than substantive constitutional reform. Most 
obviously, institutional reform would mean addressing the double asymmetries of devolution: 
                                                          
93 ,QUHODWLRQWR6FRWODQGVHH&.LGGDQG03HWULHµ7KH,QGHSHQGHQFH5HIHUHQGXPLQ+LVWRULFDODQG3ROLWLFDO
&RQWH[W¶ in McHarg et al (n 8) 29. 
94 See Mitchell (n 7). 
95 See eg D Marquand, Decline of the Public: The Hollowing out of Citizenship (Cambridge, Polity, 2004). 
96 6HHHJ06LPSVRQµ7KH6RFLDO8QLRQDIWHUWKH&RDOLWLRQ'HYROXWLRQ'LYHUJHQFHDQG&RQYHUJHQFH¶
Journal of Social Policy 251. 
97 6HH LQ SDUWLFXODU WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW¶V LQGHSHQGHQFe analysis papers, available at 
www.gov.uk/government/collections/scotland-analysisDQGVHH-*DOODJKHUµ0DNLQJWKH&DVHIRU8QLRQ([DFWO\
Why Are :H%HWWHU7RJHWKHU"¶LQ0F+DUJet al (n 8) 127. 
98 See McEwen (n 8) 232±33, 240. 
99 .LGGDQG3HWULHDWWULEXWHWKHULVLQJVXSSRUWIRUGHYROXWLRQLQ6FRWODQGGXULQJWKHVWR0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶V
µXQLWDULVW¶YHUVLRQRI8QLRQLVPDQGKHQFHKHUIDLOXUHWRUHVSHFW6FRttish autonomy and difference: (n 93) 38±43. 
100 6HHHJ67LHUQH\µ*LYLQJZLWK2QH+DQG6FRWWLVK'HYROXWLRQZLWKLQD8QLWDU\6WDWH¶International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 730; N McEwen and B Petersohnµ%HWZHHQ$XWRQRP\DQG,QWHUGHSHQGHQFH7KH
&KDOOHQJHVRI6KDUHG5XOHDIWHUWKH6FRWWLVK5HIHUHQGXP¶Political Quarterly 192.  
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on the one hand, creating meaningful self-government for England, as well as addressing those 
other asymmetries which particularly cause resentment (such as the funding of devolved 
government);101 on the other hand, reform of the central state apparatus to give due recognition 
to territorial diversity, for instance, by strengthening and codifying institutions for inter-
governmental relations,102 or by reconstituting the House of Lords as a territorial chamber.103 
+RZHYHU RWKHU LQVWLWXWLRQDO UHIRUPV VXFK DV UHIRUP RI WKH +RXVH RI &RPPRQV¶ HOHFWRUDO
system, may also be important in promoting territorial inclusion. The first-past-the-post system 
arguably exacerbates territorial conflict by artificially amplifying geographical differences. For 
instance, the fact that the SNP won 56 out of 59 seats at the 2015 General Election on only 50 
per cent of the popular vote has had the unhelpful effect of making normal party competition 
in the Commons chamber look like conflict between Scotland and the rest of the UK.  
In addition, VLQFHDµIHGHUDOPLQGVHW¶ LVDERXWDWWLWXGHVDVZHOODVDERXW LQVWLWXWLRQDO
structures, a political approach to the problem of territorial diversity suggests a need to pay 
attention to the broader conditions of political solidarity beyond the formal constitution. 
Political party organisation, media structures and behaviour, pressure group activity, and so on, 
may also be important in promoting or undermining territorial inclusion. But a focus on 
political solidarity also suggests that there may be substantive limits to the degree of territorial 
diversity that the UK constitution can bear. Since the extent of sub-state autonomy varies 
widely in different constitutions, it is hard to derive limits to territorial diversity a priori; what 
matters for the maintenance of political solidarity will vary from context to context. 
Nevertheless, if the state ceases to be a site of meaningful common political identity, then its 
survival as a state must be in doubt. 
It also needs to be recognised that there are significant obstacles to the achievement of 
the kind of institutional reforms just discussed. The need for devolution to England is easy to 
state, but remains difficult to achieve. The insight of the Kilbrandon Commission104 that the 
UK is too deeply asymmetrical in both its population and history for a symmetrical 
constitutional model to be feasible still holds true. A federation with England as a single 
territorial unit would face simultaneous problems of English dominance in central decision-
making and a severe democratic deficit to the extent that the minority nations could overrule 
an English majority.105 Breaking up England into regional units would solve the geographic 
problem but would create its own legitimacy issues, both insofar as there is no obvious demand 
for strong regional government in England106 and regional boundaries are contested,107 and 
because to treat the smaller UK nations as constitutionally equivalent to English regions would 
GRYLROHQFHWRWKHIRUPHU¶VVHQVHRIWKHLUKLVWRULFDOXQLTXHQHVV Other institutional reforms are 
equally difficult to achieve; reform of the House of Lords and the House of Commons electoral 
system each raise a whole range of difficult issues going well beyond their implications for 
territorial relations. As Walker has noted, the more complex and inter-related the constitutional 
UHIRUPDJHQGDEHFRPHVWKHPRUHLWEHFRPHVWUDSSHGLQDµSDUDGR[RILQLWLDWLYH¶108²ieµWKH
                                                          
101 See Henderson et al (n 20) 271. 
102 See eg McEwen and Petersohn (n 100); Calman Commission (n 88); Smith Commission (n 89). 
103 As proposed by the Labour Party prior to the 2015 General Election: VHH/DERXU3DUW\3UHVV5HOHDVHµ/DERXU
$QQRXQFHV3ODQVWR*LYH5HJLRQVDQG1DWLRQV*UHDWHU3RZHUDQGD6WURQJHU9RLFHLQ:HVWPLQVWHU¶, 31 October 
2014, available at press.labour.org.uk/post/101667859054/labour-announces-plans-to-give-regions-and-nations.  
104 Royal Commission on the Constitution, Volume 1: Report (Cmnd 5460, 1973). 
105 MacCormick (n 71) 195. 
106 As noted above (n 33 and accompanying text), regional devolution was abandoned in 2004 due to lack of 
popular support, and City Devolution deals have also been rejected in some local authority areas. 
107 See, eg, the recent dispute over the inclusion of Chesterfield within the Sheffield City Region under the Cities 
and Local Government Devolution Act 2016: R (Derbyshire CC) v Barnsley, Doncaster, Rotherham and Sheffield 
Combined Authority [2016] EWHC 3355 (Admin). 
108 1:DONHUµ2XU&RQVWLWXWLRQDO8QVHWWOHPHQW¶>@PL 529, 542. 
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divisions and centrifugal political IRUFHV WKDW PDNH ³MRLQHG XS´ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO UHIRUP VR
pressing also make it very unlikely to KDSSHQ¶109 It is, in any event, difficult to detect much 
appetite for constitutional reform of this nature,110 and given that dealing with the consequences 
of Brexit is likely to dominate the political agenda for the foreseeable future, it is hard to 
imagine that other constitutional reforms will be seen as a high priority any time soon.111  
 
VI. CONCLUSION: BREXIT AND THE TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTION 
 
In fact, given the current polarised state of territorial politics, so greatly exacerbated by Brexit, 
the break-up of the UK seems a more likely prospect than its significant reform. Brexit is, par 
excellence, an illustration of the lack of a federal spirit at the heart of the territorial constitution, 
and of the dangers of political fragmentation. The decision to hold a referendum on EU 
membership was driven not by any constitutional imperative, but rather purely by political 
ones: it was an attempt to resolve long-standing divisions in the Conservative party over the 
merits of EU membership, and to respond to the increasing electoral popularity of the UK 
Independence Party. Notwithstanding that these were predominantly English concerns,112 and 
the clear possibility of a territorially-divided result, the &RQVHUYDWLYH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLWLFDO
incentive was to respond to its electoral base in England, even if that led it in a direction which 
was difficult to reconcile with its avowed stance as a unionist party. Indeed, the decision to 
press ahead with the EU referendum in the face of opposition from the Scottish and Welsh 
Governments and from most of NorWKHUQ ,UHODQG¶V SROLWLFDO SDUWLHV VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH 8.
Government was at best reckless as to its implications for territorial relations. 
Both before and after the referendum, a territorially-inclusive approach to the Brexit 
decision was offered but rejected. First, the Scottish National Party attempted unsuccessfully 
to amend the European Union Referendum Bill to create a requirement of parallel consent to 
Brexit; in other words, for µLeave¶ to win, there would need to be a majority across the UK and 
in each of its four constituent units. After the vote, the unexpected challenge to the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VULJKWWRLQLWLDWHWKHSURFHVVRIZLWKGUDZLQJIURPWKH(8XQGHU Article 50 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) under the Royal Prerogative created an opportunity to 
reassert the parallel consent principle in the form of an argument that, if statutory authorisation 
were required to trigger Article 50, such legislation would also require the consent of the 
devolved legislatures under the Sewel Convention. Although the Supreme Court in the Miller 
case did not reach a conclusive view on whether or not the Sewel Convention was engaged,113 
its decision that this was a political rather than legal matter enabled the UK Government simply 
to continue to assert its prior position that devolved consent was not required, on the basis that 
the decision to withdraw from the EU was a matter reserved to the UK Government with (in 
its view) no major impact on the devolution arrangements.114 Similarly, despite initially 
committing to WKH µIXOO HQJDJHPHQW¶RI WKHGHYROYHGJRYHUQPHQWV LQHVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH8.¶V
                                                          
109 1:DONHUµ7KH7HUULWRULDO&RQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKH)XWXUHRI6FRWODQG¶LQ0F+DUJet al (n 8) 247, 270. 
110 For instance, while the Scottish Labour Party has recently committed to the creation of a federal UK, this is 
not yet UK Labour policy: see eg 6 &DUUHOO µ/DERXU ([SHFWHG WR &RQVLGHU 3RVVLELOLW\ RI )HGHUDO 8.¶ The 
Guardian, 24 February 2017. 
111 eg, the UK Government has already confirmed that human rights reform will be postponed until after Brexit: 
VHH'%RQGµ%ULWLVK%LOORI5LJKWV'HOD\HG8QWLO$IWHU%UH[LW/L]7UXVV5HYHDOV¶Politics Home, 23 February 
2017. 
112 See Wyn Jones et al (n 53)%:HOOLQJVµ(QJOLVK1DWLRQDOLVPDQG(XURVFHSWLFLVP2YHUODSDQG6XSSRUW(DFK
2WKHULQ,PSRUWDQW:D\V¶British Politics and Policy Blog, 29 April 2014. 
113 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 2 WLR 583, [132]. 
114 See HM Government, Supplementary Supreme Court Printed Case of the Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union (Devolution Issues) (2016); Explanatory Notes to the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Bill (2017) para 9. 
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negotiating position on Brexit,115 this commitment has waned over time in favour of a 
reassertion of the decisiveness of the UK-ZLGH%UH[LWYRWHDQGRIWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VULJKW
to determine its meaning.116 Thus WKH6FRWWLVKDQG:HOVK*RYHUQPHQWV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRUDµVRIW
%UH[LW¶ZKLFh would enable the UK to remain part of the EU Single Market,117 has effectively 
been dismissed by the UK Government,118 without any sign of serious engagement with their 
proposals,119 DQGWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUQRWLILHGWKH8.¶VLQWHQWLRQWRZLWKGUDZ from the EU under 
Article 50 TEU on 29 March 2017 without agreeing a common position with them.  
On the one hand, the rejection of a territorially inclusive approach is unsurprising. 
*LYHQ WKH DV\PPHWU\ LQ WKH 8.¶V SRSXODWLRQV LW ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ constitutionally 
problematic²as well as politically difficult for both the Conservative Government and the 
Labour Opposition²for the minority nations to exercise a territorial veto over Brexit or a 
decisive influence over the form it takes. On the other hand, it leaves a choice between two 
equally unpalatable alternatives.  
The µconstitutionally homogenising¶ approach that the UK Government currently 
seems to be favouring leaves little room for territorial influence, and would stand as a dramatic 
illustration of the democratic vulnerability of the minority nations within the Union, and of a 
lack of sensitivity to their particular political and constitutional concerns. The suggestion in the 
8. *RYHUQPHQW¶V %UH[LW :KLWH 3DSHU120 that decisions currently made at EU level will 
predominantly be repatriated to the UK Government rather than to the devolved governments, 
even where prima facie within devolved competence, would also involve a major rebalancing 
of power within the territorial constitution in favour of the UK level. Predictably, the 
constitutionally homogenising approach has led to the reopening of the question of Scottish 
independence,121 as well as unhelpfully raising the political temperature within Northern 
Ireland. 
Alternatively, ZKDWPLJKWEHWHUPHGDµUDGLFDOO\DV\PPHWULFDO¶DSSURDFK²involving 
either the negotiation of bespoke relationships with the EU for Northern Ireland and/or 
Scotland or conceding significant additional devolved powers²would involve such an 
extensive degree of territorial variation that it is hard to see how any sense of common 
citizenship could survive. In particular, if Brexit were to lead to differential relationships with 
the EU, this would introduce fundamental differences not only in institutional relationships, 
but also in constitutional values, and in the nature and location of sovereignty, all of which 
would have such far-reaching practical consequences that Scotland and Northern Ireland would 
to all intents and purposes become mini-states, only loosely connected to the rest of the UK. 
For this reason alone, quite apart from any technical or political obstacles that such proposals 
would face, differential Brexit seems like a degree of constitutional diversity too far. 
Ultimately, therefore, it is difficult to conceive of any satisfactory solution to the 
territorial difficulties caused by the EU referendum result which does not, sooner or later, put 
the survival of the UK at risk. In these circumstances, worrying about the need for greater unity 
in the territorial constitution has the air of shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted. 
                                                          
115 6HH'DYLG&DPHURQ¶VUHVLJQDWLRQVSHHFKRQ-Xne 2016. 
116 6HHHJµ7KHUHVD0D\8UJHV6FRWVWR8VH/RFDO(OHFWLRQVWR5HMHFW,QGHSHQGHQFH¶Holyrood Magazine, 26 
February 2017. 
117 See references in n 9. 
118 HM Government, 7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V([LWIURPDQG1HZ3DUWQHUVKLSZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ (Cm 9417, 
2017). 
119 See Holyrood Magazine (n 116). 
120 HM Government (n 118) para 3.4. 
121
 See n 67 above.   
